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Abstract 
This article briefly summarizes what is known about the formation and revision of norms59 and 
applies that knowledge to the ongoing process of norm formation in the United States with regard 
to remotely piloted vehicles as they are currently being used for assassination 60.  It focuses 
particularly on the use of drones in Afghanistan, but its arguments apply to their use in places like 
Yemen, Somalia, and Libya as well.  It recommends distinguishing between the military’s and the 
CIA’s drone programs, finds that the military’s program is far more in line with American norms 
and argues that the CIA’s program should be terminated or brought into line with those norms. 
w v w 
Since Michael Walzer published Just and Unjust Wars in 1977, argument regarding ethics in 
international affairs has taken account of the idea that norms are formed through discourse among 
authors, ministers, editors, professors, politicians, and, as he put it, "publicists of all kinds." 61  
Scholarly attention to the importance and function of public discourse in norm formation has grown 
over the intervening decades.  More recently, a number of scholars including Ward Thomas, Jeffrey 
Legro, Robert Price62 and Stephen Krasner63 have established that norms in international relations, 
particularly norms regarding the use of force, are "products of political processes." 64  They argue that 
norms are developed and propagated because they express a moral conviction but also because they 
offer the individuals, organizations and states that adopt them important elements of political 
advantage.  In this sense norms are "politically constructed." 65 
The political construction of norms and rules systems has been recognized for some time.  In the 
same year that Michael Walzer published Just and Unjust Wars, Hedley Bull wrote in The Anarchical 
Society that "any historical system of rules will be found to serve the interests of the ruling or 
dominant elements of society more adequately than it serves the interests of the others." 66 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The term “norms” will be used in this paper in the simple and common sense fashion that Legro recommends, that is 
as "collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors."  (See Jeffrey Legro, "Which Norms Matter?  Revisiting 
the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism in World War II", International Organization 51:1   (Winter 1997). 
60 Assassination is the killing of an individual by surprise attack, often treacherously and often out of political or religious 
motives.  This article employs the term “assassination" rather than the more recent term “targeted killing” because the 
substitution of a new term severs the concept from the discourse which has long surrounded it.  This article aligns with 
current scholarship on norms that argues that it is through discourse that norms are formed and revised.  Therefore 
discourse ought not be distorted by the substitution of new and anodyne terms that strip a concept of important 
historical and social associations.  This point is famously made by George Orwell in his essay “Politics and the English 
Language.” 
61 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977) page 14. 
62 Richard Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” International Organization 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995.) 
63 Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.) 
64 Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983) chapter 2. 
65 Ward Thomas, 2001, page 30. 
66 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, Columbia University Press, 1977)  page 55, quoted in Ward Thomas, 
The Ethics of Destruction, page 30.  For an example of politically constructed norms, Bull looked to Michael Howard and 
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None of these scholars argues that norms are purely pragmatic and reflect nothing more than 
political factors.  Norms, as Thomas, Legro, Price, Krasner, McElroy67 and others demonstrate, 
derive from values and widely held moral intuitions.  They would add, however, that political, social 
and cultural interests play a crucial role as intervening factors in norms' development.  Norms, 
Thomas finds, "typically comprise two strands: one based upon a priori moral principles, and the 
other grounded in more historically contingent cultural and geographical factors."68  That second 
strand often reflects political interests defined in terms of power and may be thought of as the 
“power function” of the norm. 
Norms for American use of air power historically have conformed to these principles.  In World 
War II the strand based on a priori moral principles was subdued by the exigencies of war, as is 
commonly the case during wartime in all cultures.  Wars bring distortions to the “collective 
expectations of proper behavior of actors” (as we have defined norms) and these distortions arise 
from the inflamed public passions of wartime, a perceived degree of necessity that trumps a 
previously established norm, the practice of secrecy which can decrease visibility, and the sense that 
the enemy's crimes justify any action of our own.  Once a war ends there is often a "reset" as the 
moral impulse at the root of societal norms reemerges from under the factors that had overlaid it. 
Such distortion is evident in the public discourse surrounding a massive air attack on Tokyo in early 
March 1945.  The front-page article in the New York Times describing the attack runs for several 
dozen column inches but never directly mentions the near certain fact that many tens of thousands 
of non-combatants were killed.  The article implicitly accepts that there were such levels of 
casualties, since it declares that "the raid was designed to attack an area of ten square miles” and later 
states that "the density of population is 100,000 to the square mile."69  This item of public discourse, 
which was typical of the articles that appeared in American newspapers at the time, took no notice 
of the incineration of tens of thousands of civilians, indicating that public expectations at that time 
did not rule out such killing.   
The power function of the norm may explain the public’s expectations.  The spectacle of such 
overwhelming force rained down on the enemy with impunity (the article dwelt at length on the fact 
that all three hundred B-52’s returned safely to their bases) greatly reinforced the public's perception 
of America's strength and, in contrast to the memory of Pearl Harbor, its restored power and 
invulnerability. 
American norms regarding airpower were dramatically different in January 1991 as is evident from 
public discourse concerning Operation Desert Storm.  At that time, and to a heightened extent later 
during Operation Allied Force in 1999 over Kosovo, tremendous attention was paid to the 
avoidance of civilian casualties.  Americans’ collective understandings of the proper behavior of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his description of a 17th century debate between Holland and England over the legitimacy of attacks on merchant ships 
at sea.  Howard explained that the merchant Dutch were highly reliant on freedom of trade for their prosperity while the 
British, with their growing naval power, depended heavily on blockades and commerce raiding.  Consequently the Dutch 
championed norms and laws that would hold commercial shipping inviolate while the British promoted arguments that 
found attacks on commerce morally and legally acceptable.  Howard showed the British view prevailed, and it  prevailed 
increasingly as British naval power became more dominant.  See Michael Howard, "Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be 
Controlled?"  In Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict, edited by Michael Howard (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pages 8 through 10. 
67 McElroy, Robert W. Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992.) 
68 Thomas, page 60. 
69 The New York Times, 10 March 1945, page 1. 
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military reflected a desire for near-perfect respect for the safety of noncombatants.  Much attention 
focused on the gun camera videos which dramatically showed the unprecedented and extraordinary 
precision of what were called at the time "smart bombs."  No attention was paid to the fact that in 
1945, in what had come to be called "The Good War," the newly named "Greatest Generation" had 
behaved by standards that would in 1991 be considered grossly criminal.   
The moral strand of the norm was greatly reinforced by the contingent strand of the norm.  
Americans seemed to take great satisfaction from the fact that in 1991 they alone could perform 
these feats of precision warfare.  In fact, the norm briefly granted the United States a de facto 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force from the air.  Under the collective understandings of 
proper behavior that suddenly came to prevail, the United States alone was capable of delivering 
bombs and missiles with sufficient accuracy and discrimination.  All the other countries, with their 
"dumb bombs" were morally inadequate by comparison. 
American norms shifted again in September 2001 after the Al Qaeda attacks.  One would expect the 
distortions of wartime caused by shock, anger, and dismay to overlay the moral impulse behind the 
norm, but in fact air power norms had been so greatly strengthened that when force was applied 
from the air in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it was accompanied by simultaneous 
drops of food and supplies.70  The issue of what norms should apply was complicated by the fact 
that technological advances in precision guided munitions, real-time intelligence, swift information 
processing and excellent communications combined to transform force from the air into the 
functional equivalent of a sniper rifle with global range.  The subsequent addition of remotely 
piloted vehicles was merely one more step in the transformation of American airpower from a 
crude, city-incinerating weapon to a subtle instrument for assassination. 
Americans' collective expectations for proper behavior with regard to assassination have never been 
equivocal.  Thomas Jefferson, who had a particular gift for enunciating American values, followed 
the Swiss philosopher Emmerich de Vattel who declared that assassination was "an infamous and 
execrable practice," and that “the sovereign who makes use of such execrable means should be 
regarded as an enemy of the human race."71  Jefferson himself wrote that "assassination, poison, 
perjury... All of these were legitimate principles in the dark ages which intervened between ancient 
and modern civilizations, but exploded and held in just horror in the 18th century."72  In the 19th 
century the Lieber Code was equally clear in its condemnation of assassination.  It states in Section 
IX under the heading of "Assassination" that: "The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an 
individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government an 
outlaw, who may be slain without trial... The sternest retaliation should follow the murder 
committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.  Civilized nations 
look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into 
barbarism."73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The dramatic contrast to the standards of 1945 was captured by the remark that this practice was like starting the 
Marshall Plan aid on D-Day. 
71 Vattel is quoted in Thomas, page 58.  We know from his records of his library that Jefferson owned a copy of Vattel’s 
Law of Nations. 
72 Quoted in Thomas, page 58. 
73 The Lieber Code of 1863 Correspondence, Orders, Report, and Return of the Union Authorities From January 1 to 
December 31, 1863 -- #7 O.R. – Series III, Volume III [S#124] 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/liebercode.htm#section 9 (as of 24 March 2001.) 
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The contingent strand of the norm strongly reinforces the moral strand.  As a possessor of great 
military resources, the United States traditionally has condemned assassination as the treacherous, 
vile tactic of a John Wilkes Booth or a Lee Harvey Oswald, and it has served its power interests in 
doing so.74  America’s covert experiments with assassination in the form of the Kennedy brothers’ 
attempts on Castro and the Phoenix program in Vietnam caused great embarrassment when they 
were unearthed and examined in the hearings of the Church and Pike committees in both houses of 
Congress in 1975.   
In the state of emergency following the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush and CIA 
Director George Tenet started breaking the norm against assassination, but did so in secret.  This 
represented an abrupt change in thinking on Tenet’s part.75  The norm had been clearly enunciated 
in a public setting by the US ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk.  Accurately stating US policy and in 
line with American discourse, Indyk declared "The United States government is very clearly on 
record as against targeted assassinations... they are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that." 
American practice with regard to assassination by drone strike has developed greatly since 2001.  
The technology has evolved in the direction of greater accuracy, miniaturization, improved sensors 
for the collection of intelligence and improved information processing for the analysis of 
communications and imagery.  Drones are far greater in number and sophistication, reliance on 
them has increased exponentially and the trends for increased sophistication and reliance are clear.  
The trends with regard to American understandings and expectations of proper behavior are also 
quite clear, but should be stated. 
In the first days following the September 11 strikes, the CIA stepped forward with quickly 
developed plans for special operations in Afghanistan supported by airstrikes with precision-guided 
munitions.  The CIA was much quicker off the mark with executable plans than the Department of 
Defense.  In the state of emergency that prevailed in those days, standard practices were quickly set 
aside and the CIA embarked on an unprecedented program of missile strikes from remotely piloted 
aircraft.  That program operated and swiftly expanded without critical supervision from the White 
House or Congress.  Indeed, very few persons in the White House or the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees were aware of the significant details.  The public had only the vaguest 
notion of its nature and public opinion offered no significant restraint. 
The US military developed its own drone program months after the CIA undertook its program in a 
significantly different direction.  While there is no publicly available doctrine to explain how 
individuals are placed on the CIA kill list, the US military, with experience in the use of precision 
guided munitions dating back to 1991, has been careful to review and legally substantiate its 
targeting standards.  In contrast to CIA practice, the military has formulated and promulgated 
standard procedures for the review and testing of targeting information and intelligence.  About 180 
persons are "in the loop" in any drone strike and a target may be held under observation for hours 
before a strike occurs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Public discourse in Rome, another unrivaled military power, functioned the same way.  Livy, Suetonius and Tacitus 
forcefully condemn assassination as “un-Roman” and inadmissible. 
75 "Before September 11th, the CIA, which had been chastened by past assassination scandals, refused to deploy the 
Predator for anything other than surveillance.  Daniel Benjamin, the State Department's counterterrorism director, and 
Steven Simon, a former counterterrorism adviser, report in their 2002 book "The Age of Sacred Terror" that the week 
before Al Qaeda attacked the US George Tenet, then the agency's director, argued that it would be "a terrible mistake" 
for "the Director of Central Intelligence to fire a weapon like this."  Jane Meyer, “The Predator War” in The New Yorker, 
26 October 2009, p 6.   
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In this way, the military strikes have achieved standards of compliance with the laws of armed 
conflict higher than those achievable by strikes from manned aircraft.  This is in part due to the fact 
that an F-18 pilot cannot be as patient as a drone pilot, does not have access to equally complete and 
rich streams of information as are available to drone pilots, and does not have as ample support 
from other reviewers.   
Understanding the differing norms practiced by the CIA and the US military is necessary in the 
context of the shifting trends for target selection. When the United States began using drones for 
assassination in Afghanistan, the strikes were few and were aimed at high-level members of Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. By late 2010 strikes became much more frequent and were aimed at much 
lower value targets. According to Greg Miller in the Washington Post, "CIA drone attacks in Pakistan 
killed at least 581 militants last year, according to independent estimates. The number of those 
militants noteworthy enough to appear on a US list of most wanted terrorists: two."76 A practice that 
began in 2002 with a very few strikes on very high value al Qaeda targets had transformed into a 
practice of killing foot soldiers. It seems that the contingent strand of US norms regarding 
assassination has increasingly trumped the moral strand as the war in Afghanistan continues. 
 
Conclusion 
In complying with the law of armed conflict, the military program for drone strikes has also aligned 
its practices with American norms.  The CIA practice, without comparable accountability, visibility, 
public review or other significant restraints may or may not respect American norms.  Past 
experience as uncovered by such reviews as the Church and Pike committees would suggest that 
programs operating without substantial accountability are likely to vary widely from collective 
understandings of the proper behavior. 
As the United States begins to withdraw from Afghanistan, it will naturally reassess the balance 
between the contingent and moral strands of its norms regarding assassination. Now that the former 
director of the CIA has become the current Secretary of Defense, and the former commander in the 
Afghan war has become the new Director of Central Intelligence, the two agencies will have a rare 
opportunity to compare the relative ethics and effectiveness of their drone programs. The 
contingencies of the September 11 attacks that launched the CIA program have passed. Since the 
US military is manifestly able to carry out the necessary drone strike missions, it would seem 
appropriate ten years later to terminate the CIA program and transfer its missions to the US military, 
which has demonstrated its ability to comply with the sort of normative oversight expected of a 
peacetime military. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Greg Miller, “Increased US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Killing Few High-Value Militants" The Washington Post, 21 
February 2011. 
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